

Green Faith?

The role of faith-based actors in the global sustainable development discourse¹

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Abstract

Ethical questions in global sustainability governance have been widely discussed with respect to the role of civil society in general. Interestingly, faith-based actors (FBAs) have only attracted scant attention in this context, so far. Yet, they actively participate in international political negotiations and public debates on sustainable development. Secularization theory differentiates between religious and secular actors. To date, however, it remains unclear whether FBAs contribute a distinct faith-based perspective to the global sustainable development discourse and, if so, what this perspective is.

The present article aims to identify the relevant norms and ideas in FBAs' communications and to contrast them with other existing ideas on sustainable development. On the basis of a content analysis of the submissions by FBAs and non-faith based civil society groups in the context of the UN Summit Rio+20, the paper first investigates what visions are contained in current articulations of FBAs with respect to sustainable development. In a second step, it explores in what way FBAs' ideas on sustainable development differ from secular civil society actors' ideas. With such an analysis, the paper creates a foundation for further inquiries into the role of FBAs in the global sustainable development discourse.

Keywords: sustainable development, religion, environment, discourse, postsecularism,

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Introduction

The ecological crisis is among the biggest challenges of our time and has led governments, scientists, international institutions, and civil society to search for scientific, economic, or technical solutions. The ecological crisis does not only pose a scientific and political problem, however. It is also an ethical challenge to global society and “must be understood as a crisis of meaning” (Litfin, 2010: 117f). In the words of Al Gore, a “moral and spiritual revolution” is necessary (Gore, 2006). Ban Ki Moon, former Secretary General of the United Nations, even goes so far as to argue:

“When governments, civil society and particularly religious communities work together, transformation can take place. Faiths and religions are an essential part of that equation. Indeed, the world’s faith communities occupy a unique position in discussions on the fate of our planet and the accelerating impacts of climate change.” (Ban Ki-Moon, 2009).

There has been a long-running debate over the role of faith-based actors (FBAs)² in civil society. Some theorists have suggested that their role is minimal. Secularization theory, in particular, argues that religion has become less important through modernization processes (Berger, 1969; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This view is reflected in the political science literature where, when it comes to normative concerns, scholars tend to ascribe an important global governance role to civil society--specifically non-governmental organizations (NGOs)--while often overlooking faith-based activism. Other scholars, however, argue that FBAs can take a transformative role, pointing out that FBAs have been able to make a distinct impact on global governance, as players in civil rights movements, peace-building processes or debt-relief campaigns (Rowe, 2015). Development scholars have long pointed out the social force of religion and the potential of faith-based organizations to influence social and economic development (Selinger, 2004; ter Haar, 2011). Recently, governance scholars have argued that FBAs engage with global political issues (Baumgart-Ochse, 2010; Berger, 2003) and that cooperation with religious communities even strengthens the work of secular organizations in some policy areas (Appleby, 2000). This scholarship indicates that religion may indeed play an important role in political debates, providing a rich normative resource for secular society (Habermas, 2001). If this is the case, then it is worth examining their role in addressing the environmental crisis as well.

Sustainable development intersects in a multitude of ways with socio-economic problems such as hunger and poverty, a sphere where FBAs have been active players in global debates for decades. For instance, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I. is called the ‘green Patriarch’ due to his environmental engagement. Similarly, Pope Francis I. recently published the first papal encyclical on global environmental challenges (Pope Francis, 2015). In addition, today more than ever, FBAs actively participate in international political negotiations as well as public debates on sustainable development. This is especially the case in so far as sustainable development is fundamentally about questions of ‘the good life’ (Di Giulio et al., 2010), about how to enable all human beings now and in the future to live a life in dignity. Indeed, some scholars argue that religions have entered their “ecological phase”

² In the literature, we find references to faith-based actors, religious actors and faith-based organizations. We use the term faith-based actors as it is most inclusive. It broadly defines “organizations, institutions or individuals that are motivated and inspired by their spiritual and religious traditions, principles, and values” (Democratic Progress Institute, 2012).

(Tucker, 2003) and increasingly acknowledge their moral and political responsibility for the fate of the environment. These scholars have pointed out that different faiths share ideas of sustainability when it comes to environmental concerns (Grim, 2013; Tucker and Grim, 2001), which can not only motivate individual and collective sustainable practices in local contexts (Gottlieb, 2006; Peterson, 2010; Wolf and Gjerris, 2009) but also in a global setting (Veldman et al, 2014b). At the same time, the “greening of religion hypothesis” is highly contested and recent empirical studies “challenge facile beliefs that religion is rapidly greening and precipitating a religious movement to slow and adapt to climate disruption” (Taylor, 2015: 16). The same studies also show however, that “some cultural enclaves are very engaged with such issues“ and “at least some within the world’s religious traditions are becoming deeply concerned about environmental degradation and anthropogenic climate change and intend to make ameliorating and adapting to it a priority issue”(ibid).

One cannot assume that FBAs will necessarily have a positive influence on sustainable development discourse or that they will restrict themselves to promoting solely ideas that correspond to radical and progressive sustainable development understandings and objectives. Rather, religious arguments can be and have been used in pursuit of goals which are at odds with sustainable development objectives. There is ambivalence in religious traditions’ relationship with the environment: on the one hand, religious environmentalists argue that they may contribute to an environmental ethic, on the other hand, scholars have pointed out that religious “traditional practices are not necessarily benign to the environment” (Kalland, 2005: 1369). Therefore, “blanket claims to environmental purity” have to be critically examined (Tucker, 2003: 25).³ Yet, “[i]f the story implicit in modern secularism is ecologically unsustainable, there is an enormous need to move towards a new story” (Litfin, 2003: 33). In light of these conflicting accounts, this article aims to give a preliminary sense of what impact FBAs may have on global sustainability discourse by looking at what their ideas on sustainable development are, and whether and how they differ from those of non-faith-based organizations.

Two steps are necessary in pursuit of this objective. First, relevant norms and ideas on sustainable development that are reflected in FBAs’ communications need to be identified and compared to other existing ideas on sustainable development, in order to gauge the potential for a distinct contribution by FBAs. Secondly, developments in sustainable development governance need to be explored and compared to FBAs’ communications to gather an understanding of their potential contribution to the sustainable development discourse. The present paper takes on the first of these tasks. Based on a content analysis of the submissions of FBAs and non-faith based civil society groups in the context of the UN Summit Rio+20, it identifies relevant norms and ideas in FBAs’ communications and contrasts them to other existing ideas on sustainable development. Specifically, it asks: What language and ideas do FBAs use in the debate on sustainable development? How do FBAs’ ideas on sustainable development differ from secular civil society organizations’ ideas?

The paper proceeds as follows: First, we present the theoretical framework of our analysis, delineating the role of discursive power by non-state actors and the discursive construction of sustainable development in this context. Second, we present our methodological approach. Third, we present the empirical results of this analysis. The

³ For the Christian faith see for instance, the article of Lynn White (1967), which sees the Judeo-Christian tradition responsible for today’s environmental destruction, or today’s skepticism regarding the existence of anthropogenic climate change among evangelical Christians in the United States (Carr et al., 2012). For Hinduism, Tomalin’s (2004) study suggests that environmental friendly Hinduism is mainly a product of a middle-class elite with little relevance to most Hindus.

concluding discussion, finally, summarizes and interprets our results and identifies implications for science and policy.

Discourse, Sustainable Development and FBAs

Scholars attribute substantial political influence to non-state actors in global environmental governance (Biermann and Gupta, 2011; Florini, 2000; Fuchs, 2007; Holzscheiter, 2005; Levy and Newell, 2005; Scholte, 2004). They argue that non-state actors do not just achieve political influence via state-actors today, i.e. through lobbying. Rather, non-state actors also shape politics and policy in a more direct way, for instance via taking an active role in shaping public ideas and beliefs (Fuchs, 2007). In this context, civil society actors have received particular attention. Corell and Betsill (2001), for instance, have demonstrated how NGOs influence environmental policy negotiations and outcomes.

In general, scholars have emphasized that civil society actors shape politics and policy by providing knowledge and information capitalising on the public's tendency to ascribe legitimacy to civil society actors (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007). Specifically, the public tends to perceive civil society actors as pursuing broader societal objectives rather than private gain, thus attributing moral legitimacy to them (Cashore, 2002). One would expect that a significant share of the public also ascribes such legitimacy to FBAs. After all, their messages and activities also tend to focus on broader societal issues and objectives rather than private gain. Additionally, they benefit from the support of their membership.

One could ask, of course, whether FBAs do play a similar political role as other civil society actors in 'secularized politics'. After all, secularization theory asserts that religion is less and less important in modern society (Berger, 1969; Norris and Inglehart, 2004). It states that religion is retreating into the private sphere and that the public-political and religious spaces are fundamentally separate. At first sight, secularization theory's assumptions appear to be particularly true for Western modern societies, where religion often seems to play a minor role in politics and public space, and less applicable to some non-Western countries, where religion plays a much more visible role. Moreover, the supposed separation between religion and politics would seem particularly relevant in global sustainability governance: first, because transnational environmental issues are global issues and deliberated in supranational fora that are dominated by a cosmopolitan secular elite (Berger, 1999: 11; Bush, 2007) and second, because scientific and technical issues tend to play a major role in global environmental policy-making (Epstein, 2005). Hence, "many people view religion as an irrational and unhelpful influence on politics and public life" (Wilson, 2012: 21) and environmentalists see the language of religion often as unfamiliar and uncomfortable (Dunlap, 2006: 329).

However, a growing literature has questioned the assumed separation between religion and politics and the perception of politics as a secular space (Barbato and Kratochwil, 2009; Kubáľková, 2000; Kratochwil, 2005). In this view, religion is an important part of the public sphere and questions dominant social and political forces, beliefs and values (Audi and Wolterstorff, 1997). Indeed, we can notice many voices of FBAs in political debates. Development scholars, for instance, have pointed out that FBAs play an important role in support for global development agendas as well as the adoption and implementation of development goals in local communities (Marshall, 2011). Similarly, governance scholars have argued that religion is not only a problem in so far as it may cause conflict in global governance but also part of the solution to global problems (Falk, 2002). Thus, FBAs may provide normative social and political foundations for global governance (Berger, 2003; Falk, 2002). Accordingly, the potential contribution of FBAs to global governance in general, and global sustainability governance, in particular, deserves our attention.

This is even more the case since critical and constructivist approaches ascribe increasing importance to the role of norms and ideas in politics and policy (Hajer, 1995; West and Loomis, 1999). They point out the permanent presence of discursive contests in the public and political debate (Dryzek, 2005). Importantly, shifts in the balance of discourses tend not to occur abruptly but slowly and are often related to the persistent engagement of civil society actors (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2014: 120f). As such, political change can derive from challenges to dominant discourses, or the provision of alternative storylines, which slowly shift the meaning of a political issue.

The importance of norms and ideas becomes particularly clear when we focus on sustainable development as political objective. While becoming “the dominant global discourse of ecological concern” (Dryzek, 2005: 145) soon after the Brundtland Commission placed it on the international political agenda in 1987 (WCED, 1987), the concept’s meaning has remained contested. This is partly due to vagueness, a characteristic frequently associated with broad conceptual norms and likely necessary for their popularity. It is also due to the potential impact of the concept, or rather the challenges to the existing politico-economic order that it entails. Therefore, one can also speak of various discourses connected to the concept of sustainable development rather than one singular sustainable development discourse.

Adopting critical and constructivist perspectives, scholars analyzing the discursive contests over sustainable development have pointed out how different concepts of sustainable development imply different political objectives and instruments (Dryzek, 2005; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1995; Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). One particularly influential analysis has been that of the political scientist John Dryzek. Dryzek (2005) differentiates between reformist and radical environmental discourses, which differ in how they are positioned against the dominant discourse of industrialization. He also distinguishes between prosaic and imaginative environmental discourses or – to use Dryzek’s words – whether they see the “political-economic chessboard set by industrial society as pretty much given” or “seek to redefine the chessboard” (Dryzek, 2005: 13). Combining these dimensions, he identifies four main environmental discourses: (1) ‘problem solving’, which is reformist and prosaic as it accepts the political-economic status quo and seeks small and pragmatic adjustments, (2) ‘sustainability’, which is reformist and imaginative as it sees environmental protection and economic growth as complementary, (3) ‘survivalism’, which is radical and prosaic as it recognizes limits to economic growth and challenges power relations but is limited by the prospects of industrialization, and (4) ‘green radicalism’, which is radical and imaginative as it challenges the set-up of industrial society, sees growth and sustainability as irreconcilable and imagines alternative human-environment relations (Dryzek, 2005). These environmental discourses show that the political and economic orientation of a discourse helps identify whether a discourse is radical or reformist (something that is more explicitly spelled out in later work in Stevenson and Dryzek, 2012). In addition, its prosaic or imaginative nature will tell us something about its underlying norms and potential alternative discourses.

These different dimensions of environmental discourses can be used to analyze actors’ contributions to global sustainable development discourses. Some scholars would argue that such an analysis of FBAs’ contributions, in particular, is not only desirable for a better understanding of global sustainability politics (Litfin, 2003), but also because of their “normative promise” (Rowe, 2015: 215; see also Rolston, 2006). Empirical research in the field of climate change suggests that development NGOs and faith organizations often express more transformative views, promoting for instance new economic models based on rights and justice (Nasiritousi et al., 2014: 183; see also Glaab, 2017). At the same time, studies of the role of religious actors in global sustainability politics suggest that there is not necessarily a unique contribution of FBAs to the sustainable development discourse (Berry,

2014). While some religious groups see the differences between religious and secular groups as rather superficial, others see the contribution of religion as fundamentally different from other civil society organizations (op.cit.: 280). In light of these incongruent findings, then, it is important to see if and how FBAs contribute specific spiritual or religious discourses to debates on sustainable development, and how they compare to those of secular groups.

Methodological Approach

From a critical and constructivist perspective, meaning finds its expression in discourses that are mediated through language. In this study, we look at the sustainable development communications of FBAs and non-faith based civil society groups in the context of the Rio+20 summit. We understand this summit as one discursive space, which represents a particularly vibrant participatory setting. Focusing on FBA discourses in only one international meeting does not allow generalization of the results. But given that little research exists on this topic, such an analysis provides a first understanding of the character of their sustainable development discourses and of their relation to secular discourses.

In order to compile the material for analysis, we identified groups that could clearly be characterized as religious, faith-based or spiritual by means of their title or mission-statement from the list of organizations at the Rio+20 conference that formally submitted an input document. Every participating organization could submit their ideas to be considered for the compilation of a draft outcome document of the conference. We focused on input documents as they are the most direct way of an actor to take discursive influence.⁴ Of a total of 677 submissions that were recorded, 73% (493) came from major groups that comprised non-governmental actors. Of these, those 17 documents that were submitted by FBAs were selected.⁵ This number may not seem significant and may suggest a quantitative marginality of faith-based actors and their arguments within an apparently secular space, yet most of the FBA submissions were joint submissions representing a consortium of organizations which encompass all national subgroups of one global organization or even an alliance of groups of the same faith from different countries. In particular, Christian consortiums such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) or the Alliance of Churches Together (ACT Alliance) represent far more than one hundred national and local member organizations. We do not expect the different faith groups to have a common faith focus *per se*. Rather we expect to find a range of sometimes corresponding and sometimes contradictory discourses. However, there seems to be a shared concern about the environment among some faiths.⁶ In consequence, these

⁴ Many more FBAs issued press releases, reports on their websites or organized side-events at the venue. We also could not take account of collaborations with other NGOs that were recorded under a secular mission statement or statements of religiously oriented states at this point.

⁵ The sample comprised the following groups: a majority of ten submissions were presented by Christian groups (APRODEV and ACT Alliance, Caritas Oceania, Christian Aid, CIDSE, a coalition of Faith-based organizations, Holy See, Maryknoll Sisters, United Methodist Church, World Council of Churches, World Vision International), five were interfaith statements (Earth Charter International, Edmund Rice International, Interfaith Consortium for Ecological Civilization, Interfaith Peacebuilding and Community Revitalization Initiative, Jacob Soetendorp Institute for Human Values), and one each from Buddhist (Sokka Gakkai International) and Bahá'í (Bahá'í International) groups. The divergence in representation can be explained with a different degree of institutionalization and material resources (see Veldman et al, 2014b: 8), but may also indicate differing interests and thematic emphases of the diverse faiths. For instance, Islamic groups were very well organized and active in the discussions on blasphemy within the UN. We have to keep in mind, therefore, that our results can only speak to the discourses of such FBAs in this specific political context.

⁶ See for instance the interfaith and ecumenical work on climate change (Veldman et al, 2014a), such as the cooperation of the World Council of Churches with various non-Christian faith groups (Kerber, 2014). Note,

discourses, in combination, can give first insights into FBAs' foci in the global sustainable development debate. In addition, it will be interesting to see if and how these discourses connect to secular groups and whether there are any possibilities for 'discourse coalitions' (Hajer, 1995).

A representative sample of 17 documents submitted by non-faith based civil society organizations (CSOs) was chosen for the second analytical step which entails a comparison between FBA submissions and submissions by other civil society actors.⁷ The comparison between the two groups of submissions then allows us insights into FBAs' normative contribution to global sustainability governance in terms of its distinction from other civil society actors.

The compiled material was analyzed by applying qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2014). Our coding strategy was informed by categories derived from the work by Dryzek (2005, 2012) and Dryzek and Stevenson (2011). Thus, we coded and organized the results according to the *economic and political orientation* expressed in the documents. As pointed out above, the economic orientation of discourses can be either reformist (accepting the existing liberal capitalist economic system) or radical (aiming at transforming it), according to Dryzek. The political orientation can be either conservative (acting within the framework of existing institutions and power structures) or progressive (aiming at transferring power to other levels and actors) (Dryzek and Stevenson, 2011: 1868). As we were particularly interested in the *normative orientation* of FBAs, we added that dimension, differentiating between prosaic (supporting ideas that stabilize dominant forms of environmentalism) and imaginative (proposing alternative ideas that transform environmentalism) discourses (Dryzek 2005). Of course, the economic, political and the normative dimensions of sustainable development discourses interact. Still, this differentiated approach serves as a useful heuristic.

Given that submissions to the Rio+20 conference were expected to comment on the topics of "sustainable development" and "green economy" our coding paid particular attention to the use and interpretation of those concepts. Since we are particularly interested in FBAs as non-state actors in global environmental governance, we also coded for religious versus secular reasoning. To that end, we differentiated between religious and secular reasoning on the basis of the presence of references to a deity or sacredness, or to non-religious systems of order.⁸

however, that some faith groups are apathetic towards the issue, as well.

⁷ The sample was selected in the following way: We differentiated between global and local organizations as well as between those organizations having their origin in the global North or the global South. Of each of these categories, we chose an organization that engaged with issues of development (D), the environment (E) or human rights (HR). The general dominance of organizations from the North is also reflected in the following sample: Global/North: World Business Council for Sustainable Development (D), BioRegional Development Group (D), WWF International (E), The Nature Conservancy (E), Social Watch (HR), Fairtrade International (HR); Global/South: South-South Cooperation (D), African Wildlife Foundation (E), Women in Informal Employment (HR); Local/North: Swedish International Centre of Education for Sustainable Development (D), ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability (D), Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (E), Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants (HR); Local/South: Volunteers for Sustainable Development in DR Congo (D), Asociación Ancash (D), Centro de Gestao e Estudos Estrategicos Brazil (E), Solidaritas Perempuan (HR). This selection is close to but does not exactly mirror the set of FBAs in terms of representing organizations from the North and South. The main objective was to have a sample of civil society submissions that reflects the breadth of organizations.

⁸ This differentiation allows us to notice also the use of non-religious reasoning by FBAs. It does not tell us,

Following Mayring's (2014) approach to content analysis, we combined deductive and inductive steps. Specifically, we derived our starting codes from the dimensions and foci pointed out above. While coding, we further specified these starting codes according to recurring concepts or arguments in the text. Thus, it became clear that the roles of the human and human rights in sustainable development and the economy provided one focal point in the arguments, for example, signaling agreement as well as disagreement. In a similar manner, a large share of the documents mentioned justice as a problem and/or objective, as well as pathways towards its achievement. As Mayring suggests, such continuous refinement of the codes during the repeated rounds of coding allows a particularly systematic and detailed assessment of the texts. From this analysis, then, we hope to learn how FBAs construct sustainable development, what the normative foundations of their discourses are, and how those discourses relate to those of secular organizations. With this in place, we aim to give a first indication of the potential relevance of FBAs for global sustainability governance.

Faith-based Actors and the Discursive Construction of Sustainable Development

The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) took place twenty years after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. The original summit in Rio was the largest global gathering on sustainable development issues that had ever taken place and established *Agenda 21*, which confirmed sustainability as a comprehensive political goal. Rio+20 aimed at developing new binding frameworks to pursue sustainable development and agreed on a process to develop Sustainable Development Goals. It constituted an important opportunity for civil society to participate in the political debate on sustainability. FBAs also took part in the debate through attendance, organization of side-events and pre-conference meetings, and through the submission of reports and recommendations. The Rio+20 conference focused on two major themes: establishing a concept of green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication and building an institutional framework for sustainable development.

Ideas and arguments in FBAs' submissions

Our analysis shows that FBAs did not show a consistent interpretation or vision of the terms sustainable development and green economy. We found that they were both reformist and radical in economic orientation and both politically conservative and progressive in terms of the ideas that they proposed. In terms of their normative orientation, however, it is noteworthy that FBAs often proposed imaginative ideas, which informed their political and economic orientation alike.

In terms of FBAs' *normative orientation*, we find that FBAs go beyond the Rio conception of sustainable development in so far as they emphasize the non-material dimension of development. While Rio integrated economic, environmental and social

however, whether FBAs use secular reasoning because they consider it more effective in the political arena or because their faith commitments compel or encourage them to use logical reasoning. We know from interviews conducted in a later part of the project that a significant share of FBAs intentionally chooses between religious and secular reasoning depending on the context (see also Glaab, 2018 forthcoming). We cannot assume that that is the case for all FBAs, however, and accordingly will have to be careful with the interpretations of our results in this context.

principles of development, FBAs see the non-material not only as a social dimension but as containing religious and spiritual elements, too. They ask for the integration of more encompassing “moral, ethical and spiritual principles” (Bahá’i International Community), “Pneuma (spirit)” (Earth Charter International), “ethical and spiritual questions” (Caritas Oceania) or “the spiritual dimension of sustainability” (Jacob Soetendorp Institute for Human Values; Interfaith Consortium for Ecological Civilization). Thereby, they challenge existing norms, as they bring religious/spiritual ideas into the established discourse on sustainable development, something that other secular civil society organizations do not take up.

Table I: Submissions by FBAs to the Rio+20 Conference

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| Normative orientation | <i>Imaginative ideas</i> Non-material dimension of sustainable development (religious, spiritual) Human-centered Justice |
| Economic orientation | <i>Reformist and radical</i> Human at centre of economy Economic justice (within/outside growth paradigm) Social objectives of economy Questioning of growth, economic system (partially) |
| Political orientation | <i>Conservative and progressive</i> Human rights Change of consumption practices (partially) Equitable trade system Just international taxation |

In their discussion of sustainable development, many FBA statements tend to place the human at the center of sustainable development, arguing that “sustainable development is first and foremost about people” (CIDSE). For example, some actors referred to the “human family” (Holy See; Maryknoll Sisters; Jacob Soetendorp Institute for Human Values) or “one human family” (CIDSE). This can be understood as re-emphasizing the first principle of the Rio Declaration of 1992, which stated that “human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development” (UNCED 1992), therewith bringing forward an established idea. FBAs focus on human possibilities of development. While this continuation of the Rio principle can be interpreted as a prosaic idea, it can similarly be interpreted as imaginative as it challenges the overall direction the sustainable development debate has taken since then. Indeed, in contrast to secular organizations, their focus on human development is not necessarily linked to economic growth and development. At the same time, a few statements show even more imaginative ideas when they appear to take an ecocentric perspective and argue for an equal focus on nature’s intrinsic rights and propose a planetary vision in which humans and earth are in a balanced and inclusive relationship by connecting the “Earth community” to the well-being of biosphere and species. They speak of the “community of life” (Earth Charter International), in this context, and argue that “earth rights are human rights” (United Methodist Church) or for a broadening of “human rights to include earth rights” (Maryknoll Sisters).

Moreover, FBAs bring forth a widely shared understanding of justice as “the basic criterion of applied ethics in all decisions” (WCC) on sustainable development politics. This links sustainable development with justice issues such as the eradication of poverty and social inequalities, the rights of the poor and most vulnerable and the objective of social equity (APRODEV and ACT Alliance, Christian Aid). Particularly, intergenerational justice and responsibility for the fate of future generations are an important issue (Holy See, WCC, Interfaith Consortium, United Methodist Church). Here, it is also noteworthy that the impetus

for taking action is sometimes grounded explicitly in religious norms, such as the “sacred duty to lead through example” (Jacob Soetendorp Institute for Human Values) or human stewardship over God’s creation (Coalition of Faith-based Organizations). Yet, other statements base their argument on ethical norms of shared responsibility without explicit religious reference, bringing forth a more secular sounding argument for preserving human dignity and striving for justice and fairness in development (Earth Charter International; Interfaith Consortium for Ecological Civilization).

This normative orientation further matters in so far as it intersects in many ways with FBAs’ *economic orientation*. When it comes to the discussion of economic issues and particularly the green economy, FBAs show their value-orientation in their responses. Most of the submissions proceed from the normative point-of-view that an economy also has to pursue social objectives and place the human and principles of justice at the center of concern. However, these normative principles lead to diverging economic orientations of FBAs’ discourse. Some FBAs do not question that the economic system rests on economic growth and do not see economic growth as the problem. Focusing on the economy’s benefits for people and arguing that “[t]he economy needs to generate benefits. The concern is about equity and shared benefits” (Coalition of Faith-based Organizations), they also appear to exhibit an anthropocentric worldview, again. Many organizations, therefore, take a reformist perspective and look for ways that “pillars of sustainable development can be successfully integrated” in the green economy (World Vision International). Moreover, FBAs maintain and emphasize the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) that was adopted already in the 1992 declaration, which calls for an equitable distribution of the costs of ecological sustainability among the developed and the developing world. In contrast to these FBAs and, importantly, in contrast to all of the secular organizations in our sample, some FBAs radically question the concept of the green economy itself. Some groups, such as the Catholic alliance CIDSE, caution that “a focus on ‘Green Economy’ should not become a substitute for the objective of Sustainable Development” (CIDSE). They argue instead that “a true reflection on Sustainable Development should include a questioning of existing economic trends and shouldn’t be equated with the notion of sustainable growth” (CIDSE).

The normative orientation also overlaps with the *political orientation* of FBAs’ sustainable development discourses. Some FBAs propose more progressive structural changes, such as a fundamental change of consumption logics in the form of a shift towards “sufficiency” (Jacob Soetendorp Institute for Human Values). This challenges the dominant politico-economic framework with its prioritization of efficiency and the support of consumption. Others highlight the need for a more “equitable and just global trade system” (Holy See) or changes in international taxation systems (Christian Aid), ask for improvements in the governance of multilateral financing mechanisms (APRODEV and ACT Alliance), or propose the development of new indicators to measure national wealth and human development besides GDP (i.e. ‘GDP+’), thereby addressing the structural conditions of today’s global political order.

In sum, the analysis of FBA submissions and their ideas on sustainable development and the green economy provides the following picture. There is no coherent vision among different FBAs.⁹ In particular, they differ around their political or economic orientation. However, they seem to be strongly guided by their normative orientation. On a normative level, they share imaginative ideas that consider non-material dimensions and a human

⁹ We also have to keep in mind that many of the organization such as the Earth Charter International represent a number of different groups. The differences that we found in our analysis may become even more varied, when considering the different groups and claims that are represented within one statement.

centered definition of development, and stress justice as a basic criterion underlying all decisions. Economically, they sometimes promote radical ideas and question the growth paradigm and the green economy, but similarly propose ideas which rather correspond with mainstream sustainability discourses. Politically, there are progressive ideas like changing the structure of the system through consumption practices and norms such as sufficiency. Moreover, some FBAs demand reforms in trade rules and international taxation to promote justice. But many proposed political solutions are nevertheless conservative as they take the existing system as given.

Ideas and arguments in non-FBA civil society submissions

A large number (476) of other civil society organizations, which in this context encompass environmental or development NGOs, business, youth organizations, farmers and indigenous peoples, submitted their ideas on sustainable development and the green economy in the context of the Rio+20 conference. In our analysis we focused on a sample of development, environment and human rights groups’ submissions (rather than business associations etc.), because we would expect their ideas on sustainable development to be closest to FBAs ideas. Thus, if FBAs submissions are distinct from this group, we would also expect it to be different from the submissions by other civil society actors.

In terms of their *normative orientation*, the submissions by the CSOs in the sample engaged with prosaic ideas that largely match current understandings of sustainable development. First, the three-pillar conception of sustainable development as established by the Brundtland Commission is rarely problematized, as “everyone agrees that sustainability is an economical, environmental and social issue” (FAIRTRADE International). Only very few organizations diverge in this respect.¹⁰ Second, the secular CSOs’ submissions equate sustainable development with green growth within the realm of green economy. The African Wildlife Association, for instance, integrates the two terms in “green economic development” (African Wildlife Foundation). Nearly all non-FBA CSOs use sustainable development and the green economy interchangeably or aim at re-conceptualizing the role of the economy within sustainable development. Third, some actors are concerned with the role of the human within the economic system, i.e. an economy that “must serve the people and the planet” (Nature Conservancy). Yet, in contrast to FBAs, this change of perspective is not an overarching theme. Fourth, like FBAs, non-FBA CSOs address normative issues by reference to aspects of justice, yet, they diverge on its meaning and the selected secular groups propose prosaic as well as imaginative ideas when it comes to justice. Specifically, non-FBA CSOs focus on the question of international equity between the developed and the developing world, which covers historical justice, in particular (Finnish Association for Nature Conservation), rather than intergenerational justice. In this context, they also emphasize justice in terms of human rights and the need for empowerment of the marginalized and poor (Social Watch).

Table II: Submissions by other CSOs to the Rio+20 Conference

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| Normative orientation | <i>Imaginative and prosaic ideas</i> Three-pillar definition of sustainable development Equation of green economy with sustainable development Human-centered (partially) Justice |
|-----------------------|---|

¹⁰ ICLEI, for instance, claims that the three-pillar approach is “misleading”, as the economy is a “servicing system”, not “an end in itself” (ICLEI).

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Economic orientation | <i>Mainly reformist</i> Nature as capital and resource Green economy as just economy Green economy as efficient Qualitatively different growth (partially) |
| Political orientation | <i>Conservative</i> Human rights (partially) Technological support Financial subsidies Liberalization |

This normative orientation is sometimes also reflected in CSO's *economic orientation*. Here, non-FBAs mainly propose reformist ideas, which comprise two main facets of the concept of a green economy: first, they associate it with a low use of resources and second, they understand it to be an economy which is just. Behind the first approach stands the idea that there is a "structurally and qualitatively different type of economic growth which values the finite natural resources the economy relies upon" (ICLEI). This idea is based on a general understanding that the economy is a system that needs to generate benefits, i.e. growth in which natural resources are fundamental for the functioning of the economic system. Based on this understanding, the term 'resource efficiency' best describes the green economy (BioRegional Development Group). Accordingly, finite natural resources need to be managed effectively (Nature Conservancy), which involves "efficient production schemes, green microenterprises and green jobs, products and services" (Programme for South-South Cooperation). An efficient green economy conceptualizes nature as "natural capital" or "ecosystem services" (WWF International; BioRegional Development Group). A green economy is seen to "maintain and restore ecosystem services" (African Wildlife Foundation) and to "use and develop technologies to use ecosystem services more efficiently" (WBCSD). There is a common theme among the secular CSOs' submissions, which – while identifying the finiteness of natural resources as the problem – do not challenge the structural conditions or reasons for unsustainable resource use. Just like FBAs, only a few challenge this widespread understanding claiming that "natural resources are not trade or conservation commodities" (Solidaritas Perempuan).

According to the second understanding of green economy as a just economy, some CSOs conceptualize the economic system as one that has to provide "equitable resource use" and a "fair share of the world's resources" (BioRegional Development Group) as well as take care of "human well-being and social equity" (African Wildlife Foundation) and the "well-being of the weakest" (Finnish Association for Nature Conservation). Largely resonating with FBAs' human-centered approach, justice is set in direct relation to and used in acknowledgement of human rights (Social Watch; Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants) and the opportunity for social development (Programme for South-South Cooperation). Yet, in contrast to FBA submissions, the pursuit of justice is still set within the existing economic system. For instance, the empowerment of those that are marginalized within the current economic system, in turn, is linked to questions of a better and fairer access to markets (FAIRTRADE International). As such, it is the responsibility of a green economy to correct market failures (Swedish International Centre of Education for Sustainable Development), and more liberalization is seen as necessary to make the economy more just. At the same time, "the green economy approach should [...] not be used as trade barriers against exports coming from developing countries" (Centro de Gestao e Estudos Estrategicos).

Civil society's normatively guided emphasis on justice in the green economy is also reflected in their *political orientation* in discourse. Submissions formulate suggestions to pursue global ecological and social justice, as well as rights to natural resources for future

generations and demands for new ways to measure progress beyond GDP. Most of the suggested strategies, however, rely on conservative approaches and instruments within existing institutions, such as the polluter pays principle, the CBDR or historical responsibilities as well as accounting that considers environmental costs. In addition, submissions argue that justice can be implemented with financial pledges and technological transfers from the developed world (Programme for South-South Cooperation; Asociación Ancash; African Wildlife Foundation). Moreover, while suggesting ways to improve global justice, the submissions tend less to explore the meaning of justice and to define justice as *the* basic ethical criterion from which to proceed. In consequence, questions of intergenerational equity and the responsibility for future generations also are less prominent.

In sum, the submissions by non-faith based CSOs reflect more prosaic understandings of sustainable development, largely taking the Brundtland definition for granted and equating sustainable development with a green economy. The economic and political orientations tend to be mainly reformist and conservative, suggesting that the key imperative is to work with accounting and financial and technical support to improve the system within its basic setting. In this context, justice objectives also play a prominent role. A few non-faith based CSO submissions, however, address issues of a qualitatively different growth and express a more fundamentally rights-based approach, thereby introducing radical and progressive threads into the broader CSO discourse.

Interestingly, when discussing these results with secular CSO representatives, some of them were surprised, as they felt that secular CSOs also had voiced skepticism with respect to growth and the green economy in the context of Rio+20. It is important to remember, therefore, that our results show a tendency across faith-based and non faith-based groups, but do not rule out diverging positions by individual actors in both groups. A closer look at human rights and development groups also may be interesting in this respect, as they show the most overlaps in normative orientation with FBAs. Overall, however, FBAs seem to more strongly pursue an imaginative transformative normative agenda.

Discussion

Civil society in general and FBAs in particular increasingly take part in global sustainability governance. We looked at how FBAs contribute to the global discourse on sustainable development. A content-analysis of the submissions of FBAs and other CSOs to Rio+20 allowed us to gain first insights on these issues. We found that FBAs differ in certain respects from other CSOs, while they are similar in others (see Table III).

Table III: Comparison of Submissions by FBAs and other CSOs

| | FBAs | Other Civil Society |
|-----------------------|--|--|
| Normative orientation | <p><i>Imaginative ideas</i> Non-material dimension of sustainable development (religious, spiritual)</p> <p>Human-centered Justice</p> | <p><i>Imaginative and prosaic ideas</i> Three-pillar definition of sustainable development Equation of green economy with sustainable development Human-centered (partially) Justice</p> |
| Economic orientation | <p><i>Reformist and radical</i> Human at centre of economy Economic justice (within/outside growth paradigm) Social objectives of economy Questioning of growth, economic system (partially)</p> | <p><i>Mainly reformist</i> Nature as capital and resource Green economy as just economy</p> <p>Green economy as efficient Qualitatively different growth (partially)</p> |

| | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Political orientation | <i>Conservative and progressive</i> Human rights Change of consumption practices (partially) Equitable trade system Just international taxation | <i>Conservative</i> Human rights (partially) Technological support Financial subsidies Liberalization |
|-----------------------|---|---|

Most importantly, some FBAs propose normative ideas that aim at more radically transforming ‘the chessboard’. Specifically, they promote a definition of sustainable development that is partially distinct from the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 and from secular CSOs, emphasizing a non-material dimension. Also, their economic and political orientation is more radical and progressive, questioning growth and the promotion of a human-centered economy. FBAs like CIDSE explicitly challenge the concept of the green economy, one of the core foci of Rio+20, after all, or suggest the promotion of sufficiency as a normative ordering principle for the economy. Non-faith based CSOs, in contrast, tend to have more prosaic normative understandings of sustainable development and the green economy that stabilize dominant environmental discourses and more reformist and conservative economic and political orientations. They propose different and rather specific political instruments such as transfer of technology, financial subsidies or liberalization and favor the reduction of resource use through the efficient management of natural resources, thus exposing a rather functionalist approach to solving the global ecological crisis. Individual statements, however, stress justice in the green economy or argue for qualitatively different growth which corresponds with expansive sustainability discourses.

At the same time, considerable overlap between the sustainable development discourses of faith-based and secular groups exists, in particular in terms of the focus on justice. Indeed, there is a potential for a strong discursive coalition on justice as human rights, in particular. FBAs may be a bit more progressive in their suggestion of necessary changes in the global political economy in the interest of justice, including changes in global trade and taxation. Overall, however, the proposals of FBAs and secular CSO show many similarities in this respect. Simultaneously, our results also suggest that there may be fundamental normative cleavages among FBAs with some leaning towards an ecocentric worldview and others towards an anthropocentric one. Future research needs to explore this aspect further. After all, such cleavages could be significant in that they may actually present a barrier for cooperation, just as this difference in world views often poses an obstacle to cooperation in civil society more broadly.

We were curious to see if any of the FBAs’ specific ideas and arguments made it into the outcome document of Rio+10 ‘The Future We Want’. They did not. In general, the outcome document does not address a potential immaterial dimension to sustainable development nor take up the more radical ideas raised in the FBA submissions. While calling for “holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development” (UNCSD, 2012: B.40) the outcome document does not translate this into an expansion of the three dimensions of sustainable development (ibid, I.3). Perhaps not surprisingly, the document also does not use the words ‘spirit’ or ‘religion’; and it does not mention FBAs when listing important stakeholders (UNCSD, 2012: C.43). Even the words ‘moral’ or ‘ethics’ are not used. The document puts people at the center of sustainable development and emphasizes justice and human rights, similar to FBAs and secular CSOs. Thus, it encourages all parties “to strive for a world that is just, equitable and inclusive, [...] and to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, social development and environmental protection” (ibid, I.6) and demands “respect for all human rights, including the right to development and the right to an adequate standard of living” (ibid, I.8.). Yet, in its political and economic suggestions the document mostly focuses on reforms within and not of the system. The green economy is seen as the driving

force of empowerment and not associated with any doubts. Similarly, the outcome document calls for equitable and inclusive economic growth, and fails to scrutinize ideas of growth and efficiency. Thus, the outcome document does not provide any proof of FBA impact.¹¹

Discursive shifts occur slowly, often inducing changes in ideas and concepts before they become visible. At this point, we can see some FBAs creating small disruptions in mainstream discourses on sustainable development raising ideas of immaterial dimensions or promoting (in limited ways) sufficiency instead of efficiency and growth, for instance. At the same time, the form of contestation which we see in FBA and also some secular CSO statements shows that there is no one single understanding of the meaning of sustainable development, but many different discourses. Still, the chorus of challengers represents a discursive struggle which may well destabilize the dominant meaning of sustainable development over time and the politics of green growth that are connected to it.

The analysis of FBAs in the global sustainable development discourse thus also provides tentative support for the scholarly discontent with the analytical separation of religion and politics. In global sustainability governance, FBAs' discourses on sustainable development support Berger's (2003) hypothesis that religions can offer distinctive and relevant normative social and political foundations for global governance. As pointed out above, presence does not automatically translate into impact. However, one may deem FBAs' contribution relevant for two reasons.

First, from a democratic perspective, some FBAs raise issues that otherwise may be marginalized and pluralize views in international negotiations (Nasiritousi et al, 2014). This may be especially important in a time in which discourses in international negotiations are becoming increasingly technologized and standardized (Holzscheiter, 2005: 742), alternative visions are being lost, and normative perspectives are being neglected (Anshelm and Hansson, 2011). Since discourses shift slowly, FBAs' normative orientation and their emphasis on justice and the human experience may help to stress the normative challenges of the ecological crisis in the future and thereby contribute to global problem-solving (Falk 2002). In this context, it is also important to note that FBAs do not only represent a large share of the world population, but that they also, according to their claims, represent the voices of the weakest.

Secondly, our results suggest that FBAs' contributions also provide opportunities for discourse coalitions with other CSOs, and that, as such, they may well prove to be important actors in collaborative contexts. While the overlaps in discourses do not necessarily suggest a radical contribution to environmental discourses, the common focus on issues such as justice may provide avenues for building larger discourse coalitions that can strengthen this form of normative reasoning. These coalitions similarly challenge the separation of religious and secular civil society as such, since they show less contradiction than expected. As FBAs establish themselves more and more in sustainable development arenas, it will be interesting to see to what extent they as well as secular CSOs recognize and use such potential opportunities for discourse coalitions.

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¹¹ Yet our research design was also not chosen to prove impact. Such a research objective would need to emphasize preparatory negotiations, lobbying activities behind the scenes, or a change of focus and language in documents over time, for example. Moreover, impact may result in agenda shifts in outcome documents, even without specific ideas and concepts making it into the final document.

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