Vol. 3, No. 2
First online: 10 June 2019
David
Samways
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DOI: 10.3197/jps.2019.3.2.5
Licensing: This article is Open Access (CC BY 4.0).
How to Cite:
Samways, D. 2016. 'Editorial introduction'. The Journal of Population and Sustainability 3(2): 5–11.
https://doi.org/10.3197/jps.2019.3.2.5
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While
spanning a wide range of topics, all of the papers in this issue of the JP&S are,
at one level or another, concerned with the role of global economic inequality
and its relationship to population growth, human welfare and environmental
degradation.
Developed
by Ehrlich and Holdren (see Holdren,
2018) in the early 1970s as a response to Barry Commoner’s assertion that
environmental problems were caused by poor technical choices rather than the
pressures of population and affluence, the IPAT equation identifies population
(P), affluence (or consumption) (A) and technology (T) as the major driving
forces in environmental impact (I). The fact that the absence of affluence,
i.e. poverty, is frequently associated with the growth of population is
illustrative of the interconnectedness of the components of IPAT. Indeed, low
levels of development and high fertility are firmly linked in the demographic
literature (see Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996), and the
negative relationship between fertility and economic development has become one
of the most accepted empirical regularities in the social sciences (Myrskylä, et al., 2009).
Poverty
can also be a significant driver of environmental impact in many parts of the
developing world (Masron and Subramaniam, 2018). Such
impacts are amplified by growth in population, and in some circumstances
communities under stress have breached sustainable limits in the short term. In
extreme cases the collapse of ecological sustainability has been a significant
factor in the demise of a number of societies (for an overview see Diamond,
2005) with perhaps the most celebrated example of this being Easter Island/Rapa
Nui. Discussion continues over the precise details of the vast social and
ecological changes in Rapa Nui, but most of the evidence seems to suggest that
an increase in population combined with cultural and other factors led to the
deforestation of the island, the collapse of the food supply and a huge
reduction in population (see Flenley and Bahn, 2003).
Although more complex factors are undoubtedly in play, modern-day Haiti
demonstrates how communities that experience rapid population growth (Haiti’s
population has nearly tripled since the 1960s) and are unable to expand into
new territories can have a devastating impact on their environment (Hedges et
al., 2018). In the case of Haiti it is clear that poverty and the absence of
alternative sources of fuel structurally delimit the choices people have,
forcing them to engage in deforestation leading to a massive loss of
biodiversity.
As
Kelly Austin shows in her paper in this issue of the JP&S, poverty and subsistence farming are
significant drivers of deforestation in many parts of the world. Most of us are
familiar with the role of deforestation in local and global environmental
disruption. Not only does deforestation have a significant effect on the carbon
cycle, but its replacement with cattle ranches amplifies the impact. From an
anthropocentric perspective, the loss of what is usually referred to as
“ecosystem services” to human beings is becoming increasingly well recognised,
and therefore the replacement of diverse flora and fauna with mono-cultures of
crops like oil palms is arguably of equal importance. However, it is easy to
lose sight of the unintended facilitation of opportunities for species which
humankind finds a great deal less welcome. In “Felling Trees, Furthering
Malaria”, Austin considers the role of population growth in deforestation and
consequently on the spread of malaria. While commercial logging and agriculture
are often cited as the culprits in deforestation, Austin shows how the growth
and migration of poor rural populations engaging in subsistence agriculture is
responsible for the majority of primary forest clearance. Due to a number of
factors, including issues of land tenure, these “frontier migrant” populations
are often displaced by the expansion of large scale commercial agriculture
responding to demand for food crops or meat from urban populations in both the
developing Global South and the already developed world. The consolidation of
deforested land into large commercial agricultural or ranching enterprises
pushes out subsistence agriculturalists into areas where they engage in further
clearance of primary forest. Austin’s paper shows how deforestation also leads
to an increase in the populations of the mosquitos that are vectors for malaria
by increasing their breeding grounds. We see then that, as with many other
environmental problems, a complex combination of population growth, poverty,
globalisation and overconsumption are implicated in significant environmental
transformations. The consequences of these transformations (both local and global)
are frequently disproportionately borne by the very populations whose
structural position drives their actions and who, for the same reason, are
least resilient to ecological disruption.
Austin’s
paper demonstrates that the effects of population growth on the welfare of the
local population can be direct and unanticipated. However, the effects of
population growth and shifts in demographic structure can lead to more dramatic
and socially contingent outcomes. Stewart Britten and Wahida Paikan’s paper (published in this issue) shows the links
between a “youth bulge” and conflict in the complex social and environmental
context of Afghanistan. They argue that the success of programmes aimed at
improving maternal and infant health coupled with a neglect of family planning
services has led to a demographic youth bulge (over 60% of the population is
under 25 years of age) which further threatens the prospects for peace in a
country already suffering from prolonged civil strife. At more than 5 births
per woman, Afghanistan has the highest total fertility rate outside Africa.
Three-quarters of Afghanistan’s population live in rural areas, and with the
majority engaged in subsistence agriculture or pastoral nomadism it remains one
of the least developed countries in the world. Furthermore, Afghanistan faces
important challenges in terms of feeding its growing population, with
significant environmental problems including vulnerability to climate change
among them. With insufficient productive land and few opportunities for
employment in the cities, the prospects for Afghanistan’s young people are
poor. Britten and Paikan argue that the poor
opportunities for Afghanistan’s youth exacerbates the country’s civil conflict
as young men often join the Taliban to escape the lack of employment.
While
economic and social development is not the only driver of reduced fertility
(see Cleland 1987), it is nonetheless an important factor, especially when
viewed at an aggregate level (see Bongaarts and
Watkins, 1996; Myrskylä, et al., 2009). As Britten
and Paikan argue in respect of Afghanistan, the
economic development of the least developed countries (LDCs) is likely to be an
important factor in their transition to lower fertility rates. However, whether
development leads to fertility reductions or not, economic development of the
LDCs is necessary to improve the welfare of the world’s poorest. Many have
attempted to model the complex relationship between population, global economic
development, and environmental sustainability (for recent examples see Motesharrei et al., 2016; McBain et al., 2019) and most
recognise that key ecological boundaries have already been breached. McBain et
al. have argued that although natural systems demonstrate considerable
resilience by continuing to deliver resources at a global scale, this
ecological deficit can only be maintained in the short-term. It follows that
incremental increases in global ecological footprint, whether from increased
consumption in the rich world or from the development so desperately needed in
the LDCs, will further deepen the ecological deficit unless systemic changes in
the global consumption and distribution of resources are addressed.
O’Neill
et al. (2018) have shown that in principle, with equal distribution, it would
be possible to meet the physical needs (nutrition, sanitation, access to
electricity and the eradication of extreme poverty) of the global population
within ecological boundaries. However, the universal achievement of the high
quality lifestyles, which the majority of us take for granted in the developed
world, would require 2-6 times the sustainable resource level. O’Neill et al.
conclude that a pursuit of universal human development as part of the UN’s
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) “has the potential to undermine the
Earth-system processes upon which development ultimately depends” (p.93). They
suggest that a more optimistic scenario can be achieved through abandoning the
goal of economic growth in favour of the pursuit of sustainable and equitable
human well-being. Nonetheless, for a good life to be achieved by all within
ecological boundaries, this will still require a dramatic reduction in the
resources required to meet basic needs. Building on the work of O’Neill et al.,
Hickel (2019) argues that to remain within ecological boundaries a reduction of
the developed world’s biophysical footprint of between 40-50% will be
necessary, entailing degrowth strategies and a shift toward a post-capitalist
economic model. Both O’Neill et al. and Hickel recognise the role of population
as a multiplier in ecological footprint and the need to reduce it. As Hickel
notes in relation to rich-world degrowth:
One
approach would be to gradually reduce the size of the population (in an
equitable, progressive and non-coercive way), so that GDP per capita can be
maintained even while total economic activity shrinks. But if we assume that
the population grows according to existing projections and stabilises at 9–11
billion, this will require de-growth in both absolute and per capita terms.
(Hickel, 2019, p.13)
From
this quote it’s not quite clear if Hickel is arguing for reduction in global
population per se, but this would certainly not be incompatible with his
general approach. Unquestionably, population reduction in the developed world
would have a considerably bigger impact than shrinking the population of
presently poor countries. But if poor countries justly take a larger share of
the ecological pie then, as they become more prosperous, their numbers will
eventually matter too. The now relatively prosperous countries of east Asia
such as South Korea (see WWF Korea, 2016) are a good illustration of the
transition from low to high population and consumption. While Hickel is right
when he argues that rethinking living within ecological boundaries “requires a
fundamental reorientation of development theory, from focusing primarily on the
deficiencies of poor countries to focusing on the excesses of rich countries”
(p.14), this does not mean that population growth in the developing world is
unproblematic. Apart from anything else, the provision of education and sexual
health services are of vital importance to the economic and social wellbeing of
women in developing countries. The high correlation between female emancipation
and lower fertility represents a win-win situation. Human welfare, population
and environmental sustainability are inextricably linked.
In
this issue of the JP&S,
Theodore Lianos’ paper, “Environment, Poverty and the
Steady State Economy”, develops ideas from his paper published in our special
issue on economic growth (Vol. 3, No. 1) and deals directly with the
welfare-population-sustainability nexus. Here Lianos
argues that the enormous economic growth experienced after WWII has caused
unprecedented environmental degradation and at the same time fuelled massive
population growth. While economic growth has improved the welfare of the
world’s population in general, on a global scale the rewards of growth have
been very unevenly distributed and hence one of the most significant issues
facing the contemporary world is widening inequality. Central to Lianos’ argument is the idea that two major contradictions
characterise the modern world. The first is the contradiction between humans
and nature where growth of production has led to ecological overshoot, and the
second is the contradiction between the interests of labour and of capital
leading to the concentration of profits into fewer hands. For Lianos, the two contradictions are directly related to
population growth since population is a multiplier of environmental impact and
large populations increase the supply of labour, depressing wages and
exacerbating inequality. He goes on to demonstrate that a transition to a
steady-state economy with an aim to reduce population size to around 3 billion
would begin to address these contradictions. Lianos
argues that by reducing population and keeping it constant, the price
mechanism, with some state intervention when necessary, will eliminate the
ecological deficit and alleviate poverty and inequality.
In
their opinion piece, Steven Burr, Katie McManus, and Yee Leung “Sustainability
of Equality: a Paradox for Democracy” also pick up on the issue of equitable
distribution of resources. However, they argue that while liberal democracy,
through the institutions of the state, can be effective in creating conditions
that lead to the reduction of the birth rate and hence the rate of population
growth, in terms of achieving an absolute reduction in the global population
compatible with high welfare and environmental sustainability, liberal
democracy appears unequal to the task.
We
finish with my own review of the puzzlingly titled Empty Planet by
Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson, not so much
because it is an argument worthy of consideration, but because it is
representative of a journalistic sound-bite approach to the demographic
literature that renders complexity into a sanguine view of the future in terms
of human environmental impact.
Bongaarts, J. and Watkins, S.C., 1996. Social
interactions and contemporary fertility transitions. Population and Development Review,
Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 639-682
Cleland,
J. and Wilson, C., 1987. Demand theories of the fertility decline: An
iconoclastic view. Population Studies 41: 5-30.
Diamond,
J., 2005. Collapse: How societies choose
to fail or succeed. London:
Penguin Books.
Flenley, J. and Bahn, P., 2003. The Enigmas of Easter Island. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hedges,
S.B., Cohen, W.B., Timyan, J. and Yange,
Z., 2018. Haiti’s biodiversity threatened by nearly complete loss of primary
forest. PNAS [e-journal] Vol. 115, No. 46
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1809753115
Hickel,
J., 2019. Is it possible to achieve a good life for all within planetary
boundaries? Third World Quarterly [e-journal] Volume 40, Issue 1.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1535895
Holdren, J.P., 2018. A brief history of “IPAT”. The Journal of Population and Sustainability. Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.66-74.
O’Neill,
D.W., Fanning, A. L., Lamb W.F. and Steinberger, J.K., 2018. A good life for
all within planetary boundaries. Nature Sustainability 1, 88–95
Masron, T.A. and Subramaniam, Y., 2018. Does
Poverty Cause Environmental Degradation? Evidence from Developing Countries. Journal of Poverty, [e-journal]
1–21. doi:10.1080/10875549.2018.1500969
McBain,
B., Lenzen, M., Wackernagel,
M. and Albrecht, G., 2017. How long can global ecological overshoot last? Global and Planetary Change [e-journal] Volume 155, Pages 13-19
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2017.06.002
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consumption, and bidirectional coupling of the Earth and human systems. National Science Review [e-journal] Volume 3, Issue 4,
pp.470–494. https://doi.org/10.1093/nsr/nww081
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Korea, 2016. Korea ecological footprint
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[Accessed 5 June 2019]